Plain English Summary

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is when germs change over time and no longer respond to the medicines designed to kill them. This means that the drugs, like antibiotics, that used to work against these germs become less effective or stop working altogether. This makes it very important that we develop new antibiotics that can still treat infections. However, few useful antibiotics are currently being developed. One of the reasons for this is that pharmaceutical companies consider the market for new antibiotics to be unprofitable. This is because even if a very effective new antibiotic becomes available, it will generally only be used when there are no other options, to make sure it keeps working in the future (i.e. to ensure resistance to the new antibiotic does not develop). This can make the number of patients receiving new antibiotics, and therefore the revenue from their sales, very low. To tackle this problem governments are considering alternative approaches to paying pharmaceutical companies for new antibiotics.  A “delinked” payment approach is being considered whereby manufacturers receive an annual payment regardless of the number of patients who receive the antibiotic. 

This project aims to assess how current processes for working out how much to pay for new pharmaceuticals could be adapted to reflect the specific features of antibiotics. It will also identify how payment levels could be set within a delinked payment approach. 

We will develop a framework for assessing the value of new antibiotics and how this can inform delinked payments. This work will comprise reviews of relevant literature on scientific methods, a review of the information that is typically available about how well new antibiotics work, and discussion with relevant AMR experts and policy stakeholders. 

This research will provide important information about how much to pay for new antibiotics. This can inform payment policies for new antibiotics in the UK and other countries.